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If we could get a nickel for every time the demise  may have  been suggesting  as much  when he wrote in
of  the  property  tax  has  been  predicted  in  this  the  Rodriguez  decision  that  "The consideration  and
century,  we  probably  could  invest  the proceeds  and  initiation  of  fundamental  reforms  with  respect  to
use  the  interest  to finance  a program  of property tax  state  taxation and education  are matters  reserved for
reform. In a sense, this subject  is old.  the legislative  processes  of the various  states,  and we
In  another  sense,  however,  there  is  something  do  no  violence  to  the  values  of  federalism  and
very new  about  discussing  alternative  ways of raising  separation  of powers  by staying  our hand. We hardly
money  for  local  governments.  In  August  1971,  the  need  add  that this  Court's action today  is not to be
California  Supreme  Court  issued  its  decision  in  the  viewed  as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status
now  well-known  case  of  Serrano  v.  Priest;  in March  quo.  The  need  is apparent  for reform  in tax systems
1973,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  overturned  a  similar  '  which may  well  have relied too long  and too  heavily
ruling  by  a  lower  court  in  Texas.' The  Court ruled  on the local property tax."
that  the  present  system of financing  local schools  in  This  paper  concentrates  on alternative  sources of
California,  which  relies  heavily  on the  property tax,  revenue  for  school  finance.  In  order  to  keep  the
unconstitutionally  "conditions the full entitlement to  subject  manageable,  it  makes  no  attempt to analyze
such interest  on wealth, classifies  its recipients on the  the  issues  involved  in  the  public  choice  involved  in
basis  of  their  collective  affluence  and  makes  the  allocating  resources  to education  vs.  other public and
quality  of  a  child's  education  depend  upon  the  private  goods and  services;  it assumes  a given level of
resources  of his  school  district  and ultimately  upon  state-wide  spending on education.  For similar reasons,
the  pocketbook  of  his  parents."  Since  that  time,  the  issues  involved  in  alternative  state  aid  formulas
more than  50  similar  suits have been filed in some 31  are left for other papers by other analysts.
states,  and  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  is  reviewing  an
appeal from Texas in a case  similar to Serrano.
In  March  1973,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  THE PROPERTY  TAX AND
overturned a  lower court ruling in a  Texas case  similar  EDUCATIONAL  FINANCE
to  Serrano,  finding  that  the  Texas  system  of school
finance  did not violate  the  equal protection clause of  Some  20  percent  of the  pupils  in  the  U.S.  are
the  14th Amendment.  Only time will tell what effect  enrolled  in schools operated by school districts which
this ruling  will  have on school finance  systems in the  are  subunits  of other  local governments,  commonly
states.  However,  issues  of  the  way  we finance  our  counties or municipalities.  For these districts, revenue
schools  have caught the attention of the public, and it  data are  hard to obtain.  For the remaining 80 percent
seems  likely that the effect of the Rodriguez decision  of the  pupils,  however,  data are  available. They show
will be  to  transfer  the issue  to the state legislatures,  that  the  property  tax  accounted  for  $10.6  billion,
rather than to cause its demise.  Indeed, Justice Powell  46.8  percent  of  the  total  revenues  of independent
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1Serrano  v.  Priest,  487  P2d  1241  (1971); San  Antonio  Independent  School  District  v. Rodriguez,  U.S.  1973.
85school  districts  in  1966-67.  Another  40.1  percent  much  to  be  said  tor  permitting  local  units  of
came from state aids.2 government  to  use  one  or both of these  taxes  as  an
Property  values are not evenly distributed. If you  additional  source  of revenue for general governmental
array  all the school districts in each state according to  purposes.  As  a  means of financing  schools,  however,
property  value  per  student,  the  median  state  will  they  appear  to share  a  flaw which  probably  is  a fatal
show  a ratio of about nine to one between the richest  one:  The bases of these taxes, too, are very unequally
district and the poorest. Even if you leave out the five  distributed  among  school  districts. Studying  the five
percent of the  districts at either end of the array, the  states  of  Washington,  Michigan,  North  Carolina,
district  at  the  95th  percentile  will  still  have  about  Delaware,  and  New  Hampshire,  for  example,  Levin
three  times as much property per pupil  as will the 5th  found that  the coefficient of variation for income per
percentile  district.3 pupil among  school  districts  was  0.42;  for  property
This  inequality  in  property  tax base  has  led  to  per pupil  it was 0.38.
4 Rossmiller,  studying a sample
the  Serrano  decision  and  its  sequels.  Some  of districts enrolling  more  than  1,500 pupils  in eight
proponents  seem to say that the property tax must be  states,  found  coefficients  of  variation  of  0.27  for
replaced  as  a  source  of funds  for schools.  Others  say  property  value per  pupil and 0.40 for  retail  sales  per
merely  that the  effects  of the unequal distribution of  capita  in  school districts in 35  "small cities"  of 10 to
the base  of this tax must be somehow  ameliorated. In  25  thousand  population.  He  found  coefficients  of
either  event,  it  is  clear  that the  amounts  of  money  variation  of 0.87  for  property  and  0.36  for sales in
involved will be substantial.  districts  in  35  "small  towns"  of  less  than  10,000
Furthermore,  it  seems  likely that the  equalizing  population.5 (Rossmiller  also  found  coefficients  of
process  will  require  substantial  amounts  of  new  variation for  "effective  buying income"  per capita of
money.  Parents  who  are  used  to  sending  their  0.14  in  small  cities  and  0.18  in  small  towns;  these
children to  good schools are  not  likely  to sit  idly by  results  are  at  variance  with the  coefficient  of 0.42
while expenditures  in those schools are brought  down  found  by  Levin.)  Orazem  and  Janssen  found
to  the  state-wide  average.  It  seems  likely  that  variations  among  school  districts  in  Kansas  ranging
legislatures  will  find  it  necessary  to  "average  up"  if  from  over  $125,000 property  value per  pupil to  less
they  set  out  to  equalize  expenditures.  If all  school  than  $3,500,  and  in  income  per  pupil  from  over
districts in each  state who spend less than the median  $8,000 to under $1,400.6
expenditure  per pupil in that  state were to raise their It  would  be  perfectly  possible,  of  course,  for
spending  to  the  median,  it  would  add  only  $1.3  . . spending  to  the  median,  it  would  add  only  $1.3  variations  in  the  various  tax  bases  to  cancel  one
billion  to  total  school  expenditures  of around  $32
another  out.  In  other  words,  the  variance  of fiscal
billion  in  1969-70  (Table  1).  If they  were  all  to be  a  o  h  d  c
capacity  among  school  districts  might be  acceptably
raised  to the  higher  expenditure  represented  by theall  under  a  tax  system  which  reached  property,
70th  percentile  of present  spending  in the state, $2.6  sal  nd  icme  ee  th  h  it  wa  unacceptably
billion would be  required; the 95th  percentile would  lae  o  an  o  tree  taxes.  Sme  evidence large  for  any  one  of the three  taxes.  Some  evidence
add  nearly  $9  billion,  more  than  a  25  percent  on  this point will  be provided by a  study now under
increase.  These  figures do not allow for any interstate  way  by Arthur Walrath  covering  counties (not school
equalization;  inspection  of  Table  1 will  reveal  wide  districts)  in  the  Appalachian  region.  Preliminary
differences  among states in levels of expenditure. differences  among states in levels of expenditure.  results  of this study  suggest  that  there  are no  simple
generalizations,  but there  may be  some tendency  for
counties  with  low  property  valuations  to  also  have
ALTERNATIVE  SOURCES OF LOCAL REVENUE low  income  and  sales  tax  bases.  Rossmiller,  on  the
At  least  two  sources  of local  revenue  might  be  other  hand,  found  no significant  correlations among
considered:  the  income tax and the sales tax. There  is  property  value  per  pupil,  retail  sales  per  capita, and
2U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Census  of  Governments,  1967,  Vol.  4,  No.  1,  Finances of School Districts,  U.S.
Government  Printing Office, Washington,  D.C.,  1969,  p.10.
3Barr,  Richard, et.  al., "Review  of Existing State  School  Finance Programs,"  Staff Report, President's  Commission on
School Finance,  1971,  p.  14.
4Levin,  Betsy,  et. al., Public School Finance:  Present  Disparities and Fiscal Alternatives,  Vol.  1.,  report prepared  for the
President's  Commission on School  Finance,  Jan.  1972,  p. 61.
5 Rossmiller,  Richard  A., et.  al., Fiscal Capacity and Educational  Finance: Variations among States, School Districts and
Municipalities, National  Educational  Finance  Project,  Gainesville,  Fla.; Wisconsin  Univ., Madison,  Sept.  1970,  p.  78.
6Orazem,  Frank  and  John  R.  Janssen,  Financing Local  Schools,  Extension  Service,  Kansas  State  Univ.,  Manhattan,
C-463,  Sept.  1972.
86effective  buying  income  per  capita.7 However,  the  should  be  evaluated  on  their  conformance  to  four
applicability  of his results, to one primarily interested  principles:  equality,  certainty,  convenience  of
in  rural  problems,  is  sorely  limited  by  his  sample  payment  and  economy  in  collection. 8 These
design.  principles  are  still  cited,  but  they  lose something  in
To  summarize  the  conclusions  so  far,  then, the  application  to  modern  institutions.  I  prefer  Walter
evidence  is  not  really  clear,  but  it  strongly  suggests  Heller's  more  modern  restatement.  Taxes  can  be
that  the  bases  of  sales  and  income  taxes  are  as  evaluated  on the basis of their conformance  with our
variable  as  is  the  base  of  the  property  tax.  If  ideas  of  social  justice,  consistency  with  economic
variations  among  school districts in the  property tax  goals,  ease  of  administration  and  compliance,  and
base  are  thought  objectionable,  the  other  taxes  are  revenue  adequacy. 9
likely  to  be  subject  to  similar  objections.  This
suggests  that  we  ought  to  consider  the  possibilities
available  for increased state funding.
Social  Justice
There  are  three  basic  types  of  taxes  to  be
INCREASED STATE  FUNDING  evaluated:  a  state-wide property  tax,  an  income tax,
and  a  sales tax (including its  variant, the value added
Public  finance  specialists,  in  analyzing  the  tax).  If this section  is to analyze  these taxes in terms
incidence  of  taxes,  are  coming  to  recognize  that  it  of equity, we need some agreement  on what equity is.
makes  little  sense to talk about  one tax in  isolation.  Unfortunately,  equity  is  not  susceptible  to  precise
Hence, they tend to work in terms of the incidence  of  scientific  definition.  But  we  economists  can provide
a  tax  and the  expenditures  it  finances,  often  called  some  data  on which judgment  about  equity  can  be
the  budget  incidence  of the  tax,  or  in  terms of the  based.
way  one  tax  affects  the  income  distribution  in  The  local  property  tax,  as  presently
comparison  with  another  tax  that  would  raise  the  administered,  correlates very poorly with the incomes
same  revenue,  called the  differential  incidence  of the  of the  individuals  on  whom  it  is  levied. 1 0 Evidence
tax.  on whether  it  is  regressive is mixed. Netzer  concludes
We  have  similar  problems  here.  In  a  sense,  it is  that  it  "is  more  or less proportional  in its incidence
impossible to say  much about increased  state funding  among  income  groups."1 Clearly,  part  of  the
of education  without discussing the way in which the  variation in  the tax on individuals with equal incomes
state will allocate  the funds, as well as the taxes it will  comes  from  poor  assessment.  If the  states  were  to
use  to  raise  those  funds.  A  very  regressive  form  of  take  over the property  tax as  a major revenue  source,
sales tax, for example,  might be  distributed in such a  one  effect  might  be to improve the administration of
fashion  that  the  combined  effect  of  the  tax  and  this often poorly administered tax.
expenditure  was  progressive.  Forms  of state  aids to  But  there  are  other  sources  of inequities which
local  schools,  however,  are beyond  the  scope of this  do  not  yield  so  easily.  For  example,  most  states
paper.  exempt  intangibles  because  they  are  so  easy  to
This  paper,  then  concentrates  primarily  on  conceal  from  the  tax  assessor.  But,  this  means  that
something  akin  to  the  differential  incidence  model.  two  individuals  may  have  the  same  income  and the
Our  purpose  is  to  analyze  the  alternative  ways  in  same  value  of  property,  but  pay  greatly  different
which  revenue  could  be  raised  for  increased  state  taxes  because  one  owns  real  estate  and  the  other
participation,  and  it  is  assumed,  implicitly,  that the  owns corporate bonds.
way  the  revenue  is  distributed  remains  the  same,  In  theory,  at  least,  a  state  income  tax  can  be
regardless  of how  it  is  raised.  It  is  then  possible  to  adjusted  to  conform  quite  closely  to  whatever
compare  among  alternative  ways  of  raising  the  definition of equity -- relative  to income --  we want it
revenue.  to.  The  median  state  income  tax  rate  in  1970  for a
Back  in  1776,  Adam Smith  suggested  that taxes  married  couple with two dependents rose from 0.45%
7 0p. cit.,  p. 79.
8Smith,  Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Modern Library  edition, pp.  777-778.
9Heller, Walter W., "Taxation," Encyclopedia Britannica, 21:839-841,  1964.
1  See, for example,  Netzer,  Dick, Economics of the Property Tax, Washington,  Brookings,  1966, p.  165.
1Ibid.,  p. 164.
87on an adjusted  gross  income of $5,000 to 3.8%  on an  among  taxpayers  in  proportion  to  the  benefits  they
adjusted  gross  income  of  $50,000.12  The  more  receive  from  the  government.  In  this  case,  such  a
interesting  question,  though,  is  the  extent  to which  criterion  presumably  means  that  taxes  should  be
actual  burdens  of  the  tax,  relative  to,  say,  current  apportioned  among  families  in  proportion  to  the
money income,  are progressive.  Here  it is  possible  to  benefits  they  receive  from  public  education.  The
get  lost  in  a  morass  of different  assumptions  about  difficulty,  of  course,  is the  lack  of information  on
income bases, methods of allocation, treatment of the  how  the  benefits  of public education  are  distributed
fact  that state income taxes  are deductible on Federal  among  taxpayers.  Without  these  data,  there  is  little
returns,  etc.  A recent  study by Bridges  suggests  that  we  can say about particular taxes.
in  the  aggregate,  state  and  local  income  taxes  are
sharply progressive.  3  Consistency  With Economic  Goals
On  the other  hand,  if one  compares  the net  cost 
'  ^  ^  r  i-  r  r  bEquity  is  only  one  criterion  for judging  taxes. to  the  taxpayer,  after taking  account of the fact that  A  is  i  i  a. Another  is  that they  should  not  interfere  with our he  can  deduct  his  state  income  tax  payments  in
calculating  his  Federal  liability,  there  is  a  distinct  established  economic  goals,  such  as  price  stability, calculatingv  full employment, and optimal allocation of resources. tendency  for actual tax rates to fall  off in the higher  emploment  an  optiml a  n o 
income  levels. 14  indeed, this has been referred to as a  All three  taxes present  potential problems on the last income  levels.14 Indeed, this has been referred to as a  count.
form of state-initiated  revenue  sharing.' 5
The  effects of the  property tax  on the intensity
Sales taxes are  commonly  regarded  as regressive.  of land  use - particularly  in urban areas --  has been a
Bridges found  regressivity  both when taxpayers  were  subject of discussion  at  least  since the  days of Henry
ranked  by  income  and  when  they  were  ranked  George.  Essentially, the argument  is that the property
according  to  a  welfare  ratio.1 6  There  are,  however,  tax  increases  the  cost of investments  in buildings and
ways  of alleviating this problem. Eighteen states fully  other  improvements  relative  to  other  investments,
or  partly  exempt  food  and  thirty  do  the  same  for  and  therefore,  reduces  investment  in  these
medicine  - one  recognized  way  of  reducing  the  improvements  below that  which would  obtain under
regressivity  of the  tax.1 A  more  recent  trend  is to  a  competitive  equilibrium.  Given  all  the  necessary
provide  a  credit,  through the income tax, for the first  assumptions  for a position of competitive  equilibrium
X dollars of sales tax paid.' 8 This arrangement is now  to be  one  of Pareto  optimality  (and  vice-versa),  the
in use in some seven states.'  9  result  is  a  less-than-optimal  distribution  of
From the viewpoint  of horizontal equity -- equal  resources.2
treatment  of equals  -- both  the  income  tax  and the  Similar  problems  arise  under  the  general  sales
general  sales tax  probably get  better marks than does  tax.  Since  this  tax  usually  is not  as  "general"  as its
the property tax. One need only consult any standard  name implies, it tends to raise the costs of those items
public  finance  textbook,  however,  to  find  that  -- goods,  primarily  - on  which  it  falls,  relative  to
erosion  of the  bases  of these  taxes  - exemption  of  items  such as services which commonly  are not taxed.
various  types  of  income  or  types  of  goods  and  Hence,  it may distort resource allocation.
services - materially interferes with horizontal equity.  The  argument  over  the  income  tax  is  more
There  is,  of  course,  an  entirely  different  complicated.  Much  controversy  surrounds  the
philosophy  of  equity:  Taxes  should  be  distributed  problem  of the effects  of income taxes on incentives
1Advisory  Commission  on  Intergovernmental  Relations,  State-Local Finances: Significant Features and Suggested
Legislation, Washington, Government  Printing Office,  1972,  p.  197.
13 Bridges,  Benjamin,  "Family  Need  Differences  and  Family  Tax Burden  Estimates," National Tax Journal, Dec.  1971,
p.  423.
14This  is  particularly  true  if  Federal  income  taxes  are  a  state  deduction.  See  Melichar,  Emanuel,  State Individual
Income Taxes, Univ.  of Conn.,  Storrs Agr. Expt. Sta., Monograph  2,  July  1963.
15Moscovitch,  Edward,  "State  Graduated  Income  Taxes  -- A  State-Initiated  Form  of  Federal  Revenue  Sharing,"
National Tax Journal, March  1972,  p. 53.
1
6 0p. cit.
17ACIR, State-Local Finances, op.  cit., p. 191.
1 8One  good  description  is  in  Ecker-Racz,  L.  L.,  The Politics  and Economics of State-Local Finance, Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall,  1970,  p.  60.
19ACIR, State-Local Finances, op. cit.,  p. 178.
For a  more complete discussion,  see Netzer,  op. cit.,  ch.  IV.
88to work and to invest.2 1  It  seems fair to say that we  development  may  have  pushed  compliance  costs  for
really  do  not  know how  the  incentive effects  of the  the income tax below those of the sales tax.
income  tax  compare  with  the  property  tax  or the
sales  tax, although I believe  a majority of economists  Revenue Adequacy
would  opt  for  the  income  tax  as  having  the  least  In  1970-71,  property  taxes produced  $38 billion
effect  on incentives.  for  state  and  local  governments;  general  sales  taxes
produced  $18  billion,  and  income  taxes  (individual
Ease  of Administration and Compliance  and  corporate)  produced  $15  billion.  Clearly,  these
Change  to  a  statewide  property  tax  would  taxes  cannot  be  faulted  for  lack  of  revenue
probably  require  a  change  to  state  control  of the  productivity.
assessment  function in states where this is now a local  But there  is  more to the story. These taxes differ
activity.  A  minimum  requirement  would  be  a  good  widely in  their income  elasticities.  Estimates  of the
sales/assessment  ratio  program  and intrajurisdictional  income  elasticity  of state personal income  taxes,  for
equalization  of assessments  for state tax purposes.  To  the  U.S.  as  a  whole,  range close to  1.75  - a  1 percent
do otherwise would invite competitive undervaluation  increase  in  income  will  add  about  1.75  percent  to
in  local  assessment  districts.  The  Serrano  decision  state  personal income  tax collection. 24 The  income
might  well  have  more  effect  in  reforming  the  elasticity  of the  corporate  income  tax  apparently  is
property  tax  assessment  procedure  than have  several  lower,  but  probably  averages  slightly  greater  than
generations  of  learned  studies  and  learned  one.  General sales  taxes seem  to have  approximately
recommendations.  unitary  elasticity.  Estimates  of the income  elasticity
It  is  less  clear  what  effect  a  change  to statewide  of general property  taxes in the U.S.  range  from  1.3
assessment  might have  on  administrative  costs of the  to  0.8,  and  there  are  estimates  for  individual  cities
property  tax  - estimated  in  a  Montana  study to be  and states that range from 1.41 to 0.34. The elasticity
about  2.8  percent  of collections.22 state  assumption  of this tax  may  be close to that of the general  sales
of  the  assessment  function,  if  it  eliminated  local  tax,  although  the  median  estimate  would be slightly
assessors  entirely,  conceivably  could  realize  less than 1.
economies  of scale  and  save  money.  On  the  other  A  more  difficult  question  is  to  know  how  to
hand,  there  would  likely be strong pressures to retain  interpret  these  data.  A  highly  elastic  tax  is  a
the  local  assessor.  Adding  a  state  sales/assessment  two-edged  sword.  On  the  one  hand,  it  will  help  to
ratio  program  in  states that  do  not now  have such  a  insure  that  revenues  keep  up  with  needs  as  the
program  clearly would  cost money  (even though the  economy of a  state expands and incomes  rise. On the
gain  in  equity  might  make  it money  well spent).  To  other  hand,  states  desire  revenue  stability  during  a
retain  the  local assessor  for the  remaining  local taxes  recession  - deficit  financing  to  maintain  economic
but  change to  state assessment  for  state taxes would  stability is easier for the Federal government than it is
be both costly and confusing.  for  the states  - and a  highly  elastic tax will not be a
Maxwell  suggests  that  "With  respect  to costs of  stable one.
administration,  probably the income tax has a modest  There  is  not  space  in  this  paper  to  discuss
advantage  over  the  sales  tax  - 1 percent  to  1-1/2  alternative  formulas  for  distributing  the  increased
percent  of  receipts  as  a  cost,  compared  to  1-1/2  state  aid.  One  issue,  however,  should  be brought  to
percent  to  2  percent."23 Compliance  costs  of  the  the  surface  because  it  materially  affects  revenue
income  tax  are  harder  to  estimate,  but  must  be  systems:  the  extent  to  which  local  residents  will  be
significantly  greater  than  those of the property  tax.  permitted  to decide the  amount  to be spent  on their
The increasing trend toward basing state income taxes  schools.  Some  advocate  complete  state  dictation  of
on  Federal  adjusted  gross  income  (with  minor  the  amount to be spent.  Districts  would be classified
adjustments)  or  even  on  Federal  tax  liability,  by  the  state  according  to  educational  needs,  and
however,  must be sharply  reducing the  marginal  cost  would  not be permitted  to  spend more  (or less) than
of  compliance  with  state  income  taxes.  Evidence  the  state mandate.  Others  advocate  a  state-financed
seems  to be scanty, but  one might speculate that this  or  mandated  minimum  (perhaps  made  up  mostly  of
21For an introduction,  see  Goode, Richard,  The Individual  Income Tax, Washington,  Brookings Inst.,  1964.
22Wicks,  John  H.  and  Michael  N.  Killworth,  "Administrative  and  Compliance  Costs  of  State  and  Local  Taxes,"
National Tax Journal, Sept.  1967,  p.  309.
23Maxwell,  James  A.,  Financing  State and Local Governments, revised  edition,  Washington,  Brookings,  1969,  p.  102.
24 Elasticity  estimates  used in this paragraph are  all from ACIR State-Local Finances, op.  cit.,  p. 301.
89local funds  in rich  districts and mostly of state aid in  To  summarize:  Advocates  of change  in the way
poor districts), with districts permitted to spend more  we  finance  our schools  raise important  problems and
if they want  to.  Finally,  ingenious state aid programs  difficult  issues.  The  changes  they  urge  probably
have been worked out which would make each mill of  would  force  us to  shift much more of this finance to
property  tax  levy  produce  the  same  amount  of  the  state  level.  The  choice  among  ways to raise that
revenues  in  any  district  in  the  state,  and,  having  revenue,  though,  is not  a  clear  one,  and the  issues to
equalized  financial  power,  would  then  leave it  up  to  be  faced  in  distributing  it  are  considerable.  Many
residents  of  each  district  to  decide  for  themselves  public  finance  specialists  suggest  greater  state  use  of
how much of their incomes they wanted to devote to  the  personal  income  tax,  and  this  tax  has  definite
educating  their children.2 5 The  issue,  here, seems  to  advantages.  However,  the particular type of tax which
be  between  equality  and  freedom  of  individual  might  best  be  used  to  raise  money  for  education  in
choice.  It  cannot  be  resolved  on  economic  grounds.  each  state will  vary with the  state, and many states
will want to use a combination.
25Brazer,  Harvey  E.,  "The  Case  for  Local  Control  and  Financing  of  Elementary  and  Secondary  Education,"
Proceedings of the  Sixty-Fourth Annual Conference on Taxation, National Tax Association, 1971,  (Columbus,  Ohio,  1972)  p.
763.
90Table 1.  STATE  AND  LOCAL  EXPENDITURES  ON EDUCATION,  AND  ESTIMATED  COSTS OF RAISING
EXPENDITURES  TO VARIOUS  LEVELS,  U.S.,  1969-70
:  :  :  Comparative  levels of expenditure per pupil in State and
:  :  :__  ________cost  of raising all districts to that level
Number
N  e  Total  95th percentile  90th percentile  70th percentile  50th percentile
State  of  expend- *
school  u  Expend-  A  Expend-  d  Expend- :  Expend- :  A iture  Addi-  Addi-  Addi-  Adi- : districts :  :  iture  ur  i  turete  tional  tional  tionalt
:  =:  per  :  · per  :  :  per  :  :  per per  ost  p  cost  percost  cost 
__;  _:  _:  · :_  ;  pupil  :  pupil  pupil  pupil 
No.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol
Massachusetts.....:  360  853.2  1,073  344.6  963  236.0  774  68.4  732  42.4
Michigan........  :  527  1,565.0  965  473.1  888  326.6  767  125.5  734  87.3
Minnesota.........:  475  649.7  777  107.2  777  107.2  712  57.4  650  22.5
Mississippi ....... :  148  240.5  576  56.5  541  40.6  491  21.5  453  10.8
Missouri.  ......... :  644  619.3  853  143.0  808  107.1  734  61.6  667  28.7
Montana.  .......... :  700  162.1  1,807  127.0  1,358  62.5  1,016  19.6  900  9.5
Nebraska..........:  1,410  210.2  893  79.0  786  48.3  644  11.5  621  7.7
Nevada............:  17  97.9  1,004  15.7  929  8.1  857  1.3  838  0.0
New Hampshire  ..... :  159  91.9  764  20.3  739  16.9  655  7.5  594  2.3
New Jersey........:  580  1,179.7  1,076  372.2  1,009  285.6  851  106.5  772  42.4
New Mexico........:  89  151.5  677  33.1  645  25.3  549  5.2  520  0.9
New York..........:  721  3,458.2  1,350  998.9  1,193  537.7  1,097  275.8  1,077  244.5
North Carolina....:  152  649.7  675  84.9  675  84.9  618  36.0  590  19.5
North Dakota.....:  380  94.9  826  24.1  776  17.7  687  8.2  649  4.9
Ohio  ............. :  638  1,605.1  909  530.8  881  471.8  728  182.7  648  79.5
Oklahoma  ........:  683  318.0  775  111.2  662  55.4  587  23.5  557  13.2
Oregon............:  355  363.4  953  70.4  914  54.6  811  17.7  798  13.8
Pennsylvania......:  581  2,032.9  1,102  456.8  1,102  456.8  938  180.3  845  62.7
Rhode Island......:  40  136.3  1,045  45.3  1,045  45.3  821  13.9  736  5.3
South Carolina....:  46  305.5  562  . 28.2  562  28.2  533  14.5  511  6.4
ContinuedTable 1.  STATE  AND  LOCAL EXPENDITURES  ON  EDUCATION,  AND  ESTIMATED  COSTS  OF RAISING
EXPENDITURES  TO VARIOUS  LEVELS, U.S.,  1969-70 -CONTINUED
:  :  :  Comparative levels of expenditure  per pupil in State and
~~~:  :  :__  _______cost  of raising all districts to that level
Number  :
umbr  Total  95th percentile  90th percentile  70th percentile  50th percentile :of:exed5 State  expend- school  :  Expend-  A  - Expend- :  A  : Expend- :  : Expend- :
iture  Addi-  Addi-  Addi-  Adi- :districts :  :  ture  i:  i  t  iture  :iture tional  tional  tional  tional
:  :  :.  per  :  :  per  :  per  c  :  per  per  c
cost  . cost  p.cost  cost
:  pupil  :  :  pupil  . · pupil
No.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.
Alabama...........:  120  325.7  488  50.5  473  40.2  436  17.5  407  5.4
Alaska ...........:  28  60.7  1,254  10.2  1,254  10.2  1,102  4.0  994  0.2
Arizona  ·.  .....  :  297  303.1  1,022  99.0  991  88.1  840  42.8  713  13.2
Arkansas..........:  378  168.4  546  49.0  512  37.1  445  15.5  407  7.3
California........:  1,078  3,552.4  1,075  1,382.2  918  731.2  776  216.4  747  141.7
Colorado......... :  181  356.7  853  65.0  853  65.0  793  43.6  694  14.6
Connecticut.......:  169  529.4  1,094  179.6  1,002  126.8  877  62.1  772  22.9
Delaware  ......... :  23  92.3  1,081  32.3  1,081  32.3  802  5.7  741  1.6
Florida...  ....... :  67  955.9  883  185.1  824  117.2  787  83.5  722  35.8
Georgia.  ........ :  190  545.1  736  188.9  706  162.6  534  25.5  516  16.0
Hawaii..........:  7  86.2  544  10.5  533  8.7  492  2.9  486  2.4
Idaho............:  115  120.4  1,057  56.9  904  33.6  763  14.4  664  5.1
Illinois..........:  1,220  1,934.0  1,283  680.6  1,129  401.6  1,068  294.4  892  96.8
Indiana..........:  313  686.4  779  161.9  729  112.9  681  71.3  619  33.0
Iowa....  ........ :  452  504.3  958  112.0  912  85.4  806  30.9  752  12.6
Kansas...........:  311  327.2  871  101.7  798  69.6  664  16.9  646  11.8
Kentucky..........:  193  314.3  668  109.6  576  57.1  521  31.9  462  9.8
Louisiana.........:  66  509.7  749  66.4  730  53.6  669  17.6  655  11.3
Maine..........:  268  135.4  660  23.1  660  23.1  589  10.3  551  5.2
Maryland..........:  24  703.6  1,037  175.2  1,037  175.2  826  28.1  795  14.3
ContinuedTable 1.  STATE  AND  LOCAL EXPENDITURES  ON EDUCATION,  AND  ESTIMATED  COSTS OF RAISING
EXPENDITURES  TO VARIOUS  LEVELS, U.S.,  1969-70 - CONTINUED
:  :  :  Comparative levels of expenditure  per pupil in State and
:  :  :  cost of raising all districts to that level
Number  Total  *  95th percentile  90th percentile  70th percentile  50th percentile
State  . expend-
Stae  *  tschool  A-  · :end-  :  E:  · pn  Expend-  :  A' 
distrit  iture  .Addi-  Expenddi-  Addi- :  districts :  :  iture  :  · :  iture  :  . :  iture  :  . :  iture  . tional  tional  tional  tional
:  per  :  per  per  :  :  per :  :  . per  cost  per  cost  per  cost  per  cost
*_________:  _  · . pupil  pupil  pupil  pupil  pupil
:  No.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.  Dol.  Mil. dol.
South Dakota  ...... :  658  105.2  823  30.8  750  20.1  637  5.7  607  2.6
Tennessee  . ....  :  149  428.0  629  88.9  629  88.9  577  54.0  491  14.9
Texas  ............  :  1,185  1,352.6  729  394.7  668  263.4  577  92.5  540  40.9
Utah  ..............:  40  169.1  710  33.5  630  13.1  601  7.0  568  1.4
Vermont  ...........:  247  81.8  959  26.9  905  21.4  800  11.9  687  4.8
Virginia.  ......... :  136  640.3  787  140.3  776  130.8  691  68.8  606  21.7
Washington  . ....  :  322  659.8  981  107.2  981  107.2  894  55.9  831  28.0
West Virginia  ..... :  55  228.9  708  31.4  706  30.8  640  12.3  601  4.9
Wisconsin  . ........ :  455  697.1  904  134.1  849  89.3  772  35.1  747  20.7
Wyoming  . .......... :  131  71.1  1,301  38.8  1,146  27.1  863  8.5  706  1.3
Total*  ..........:  17,583  31,430.1  ---  8,758.8  ---  6,151.4  ---  2,588.5  ---  1,285.0
*Detail  may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source:  Barr, Richard, et. al.,  "Review  of Existing State School Finance Programs," Staff Report, President's
Comm. on School Finance, 1971.I